OBS. 3.—­Conjunctions sometimes connect entire sentences, and sometimes particular words or phrases only.  When one whole sentence is closely linked with an other, both become clauses or members of a more complex sentence; and when one word or phrase is coupled with an other, both have in general a common dependence upon some other word in the same sentence.  In etymological parsing, it may be sufficient to name the conjunction as such, and repeat the definition above; but, in syntactical parsing, the learner should always specify the terms connected.  In many instances, however, he may conveniently abbreviate his explanation, by parsing the conjunction as connecting “what precedes and what follows;” or, if the terms are transposed, as connecting its own clause to the second, to the third, or to some other clause in the context.

OBS. 4.—­However easy it may appear, for even the young parser to name the terms which in any given instance are connected by the conjunction, and of course to know for himself what these terms are,—­that is, to know what the conjunction does or does not, connect,—­it is certain that a multitude of grammarians and philosophers, great and small, from Aristotle down to the latest modifier of Murray, or borrower from his text, have been constantly contradicting one an other, if not themselves, in relation to this matter.  Harris avers, that “the Conjunction connects, not Words, but Sentences;” and frames his definition accordingly.  See Hermes, p. 237.  This doctrine is true of some of the conjunctions, but it is by no means true of them all.  He adds, in a note, “Grammarians have usually considered the Conjunction as connecting rather single Parts of Speech, than whole Sentences, and that too with the addition of like with like, Tense with Tense, Number with Number, Case with Case, &c.  This Sanctius justly explodes.”—­Ib., p. 238.  If such has been the usual doctrine of the grammarians, they have erred on the one side, as much as our philosopher, and his learned authorities, on the other.  For, in this instance, Harris’s quotations of Latin and Greek writers, prove only that Sanctius, Scaliger, Apollonius, and Aristotle, held the same error that he himself had adopted;—­the error which Latham and others now inculcate, that, “There are always two propositions where there is one Conjunction.”—­Fowler’s E. Gram., 8vo, 1850, p. 557.

OBS. 5.—­The common doctrine of L. Murray and others, that, “Conjunctions connect the same moods and tenses of verbs, and cases of nouns and pronouns,” is not only badly expressed, but is pointedly at variance with their previous doctrine, that, “Conjunctions very often unite sentences, when they appear to unite only words; as in the following instances:  ’Duty and interest forbid vicious indulgences;’ ‘Wisdom or folly governs us.’  Each of these forms of expression,” they absurdly say, “contains two sentences.”—­Murray’s