of our simple original perceptions.  “All words standing for complex ideas are definable; but those by which we denote simple ideas, are not.  For the perceptions of this latter class, having no other entrance into the mind, than by sensation or reflection, can be acquired only by experience.”—­Duncan’s Logic, p. 63.  “And thus we see, that as our simple ideas are the materials and foundation of knowledge, so the names of simple ideas may be considered as the elementary parts of language, beyond which we cannot trace the meaning and signification of words.  When we come to them, we suppose the ideas for which they stand to be already known; or, if they are not, experience alone must be consulted, and not definitions or explications.”—­Ibid., p. 69.

19.  But this is no apology for the defectiveness of any definition which might be made correct, or for the effectiveness of our English grammars, in the frequent omission of all explanation, and the more frequent adoption of some indirect form of expression.  It is often much easier to make some loose observation upon what is meant by a given word or term in science, than to frame a faultless definition of the thing; because it is easier to refer to some of the relations, qualities, offices, or attributes of things, than to discern wherein their essence consists, so as to be able to tell directly and clearly what they are.  The improvement of our grammatical code in this respect, was one of the principal objects which I thought it needful to attempt, when I first took up the pen as a grammarian.  I cannot pretend to have seen, of course, every definition and rule which has been published on this subject; but, if I do not misjudge a service too humble for boasting, I have myself framed a greater number of new or improved ones, than all other English grammarians together.  And not a few of them have, since their first publication in 1823, been complimented to a place in other grammars than my own.  This is in good keeping with the authorship which has been spoken of in an other chapter; but I am constrained to say, it affords no proof that they were well written.  If it did, the definitions and rules in Murray’s grammar must undoubtedly be thought the most correct that ever have been given:  they have been more frequently copied than any others.

20.  But I have ventured to suggest, that nine tenths of this author’s definitions are bad, or at least susceptible of some amendment.  If this can be shown to the satisfaction of the reader, will he hope to find an other English grammar in which the eye of criticism may not detect errors and deficiencies with the same ease?  My object is, to enforce attention to the proprieties of speech; and this is the very purpose of all grammar.  To exhibit here all Murray’s definitions, with criticisms upon them, would detain us too long.  We must therefore be content to take a part of them as a sample.  And, not to be accused of fixing only upon the worst, we will take a series.  Let us then consider in their order his definitions of the nine parts of speech;—­for, calling the participle a verb, he reduces the sorts of words to that number.  And though not one of his nine definitions now stands exactly as it did in his early editions, I think it may be said, that not one of them is now, if it ever has been, expressed grammatically.