one out for themselves.  This style of declamation has been not unaptly called “splendid nonsense,” and it was after a display of this sort from Burke, that one of his audience made this pithy exclamation:  “It is all very well, but I should like to hear it over again, that I might consider the sense.”  Burke also dealt in paradoxes occasionally; in short, he will seldom satisfy a careful reader, and his most ardent admirers have been known to confess themselves rather pleased than edified by his works.  By way of specimen, as to the remarks we have ventured to make, we shall endeavour to take to pieces the following sophism, for a sophism we cannot help considering it:—­

“Duties are not voluntary; duty and will are even contradictory terms.”—­“Men have an extreme disrelish to be told of their duty; this is, of course, because every duty is a limitation of power.”

These two sentences are taken from different parts of the writings of Burke, but they are the same in tendency, though not in expression; they imply simply, that duty is a restraint, and that our duties and our inclinations call us different roads.  Let us first consider what the term “duty” signifies.  From Johnson we get this explanation of it:  “What we are bound to do by the impulse of nature, the dictates of law, or the voice of reason.”  Now, to take these three cases as they stand, nature has surely ordained everything for our advantage, and therefore in obeying her, we have rather an accession than a diminution of power; with respect to ourselves, the calls of nature are even agreeable to us; and as far as our duties concern others, men seem in general to perform their natural duties willingly, such as a duty to a child, a parent, &c.  Then with regard to the duties imposed on us by law, many of these appear indeed at first to be great and unnecessary restraints, but if we examine the matter, we shall find that very few laws have been framed that have not rather good than evil for their object.  Society doubtless imposes many restrictions on its members, but it also confers far greater comparative advantages in lieu of them, so that if we were fairly to weigh the benefits received, against the losses sustained, we should find law to be a blessing, without which we could not exist in any real comfort; and we should see clearly then it gives power and elevates, rather than shackles or debases us.  As to these legal duties being voluntary with all men, every day proves that they are not; but with all reasonable persons they must be, for we ought surely to perform that willingly, which is not only intended, but actually is, for our good.  It is the perverse nature of man, that looks on the dark side of things, and forgetting the ultimate advantage to be derived, considers only the partial and trivial annoyances that necessarily attend its completion.  The duties dictated by reason are the only duties that remain:  it is difficult to separate these entirely from natural duties;