of mankind, and observes the various creeds of different ages and nations, the peculiar modes of thinking of sects and bodies and individuals, the notions once firmly held, which have been exploded, the prejudices once universally prevalent, which have been removed, and the endless controversies which have distracted those who have made it the business of their lives to arrive at the truth; and when he further dwells on the consideration that many of these, his fellow-creatures, have had a conviction of the justness of their respective sentiments equal to his own, he cannot help the obvious inference, that in his own opinion it is next to impossible that there is not an admixture of error; that there is an infinitely greater probability of his being wrong in some than right in all.’[32]

Of course this is not an account of the actual frame of mind of ordinary men.  They never do think of their opinions in the aggregate in comparison with the collective opinions of others, nor ever draw the conclusions which such reflections would suggest.  But such a frame of mind is perfectly attainable, and has often been attained, by persons of far lower than first-rate capacity.  And if this is so, there is no reason why it should not be held up for the admiration and imitation of all those classes of society which profess to have opinions.  It would thus become an established element in the temper of the age.  Nor need we fear that the result of this would be any flaccidity of conviction, or lethargy in act.  A man would still be penetrated with the rightness of his own opinion on a given issue, and would still do all that he could to make it prevail in practice.  But among the things which he would no longer permit himself to do, would be the forcible repression in others of any opinions, however hostile to his own, or of any kind of conduct, however widely it diverged from his own, and provided that it concerned themselves only.  This widening of his tolerance would be the natural result of a rational and realised consciousness of his own general fallibility.

Next, even belief in one’s own infallibility does not necessarily lead to intolerance.  For it may be said that though no man in his senses would claim to be incapable of error, yet in every given case he is quite sure that he is not in error, and therefore this assurance in particular is tantamount by process of cumulation to a sense of infallibility in general.  Now even if this were so, it would not of necessity either produce or justify intolerance.  The certainty of the truth of your own opinions is independent of any special idea as to the means by which others may best be brought to share them.  The question between persuasion and force remains apart—­unless, indeed, we may say that in societies where habits of free discussion have once begun to take root, those who are least really sure about their opinions, are often most unwilling to trust to persuasion to bring them converts, and most