duress, allowed by the 13th Sect. and the exception likewise in the 14th Sect. concerning felons) but they are all included under the general titles of “the subject, any of the said subjects, every such person” &c.  Now the definition of the word “person,” in its relative or civil capacity (according to Wood. b.  I. c. 11. p. 27.) is either the King, or a subject.  These are the only capital distinctions that can be made, tho’ the latter consists of a variety of denominations and degrees.

But if I were even to allow, that a Negroe slave is not a subject, (though I think I have clearly proved that he is) yet it is plain that such an one ought not to be denied the benefit of the King’s court, unless the slave-holder shall be able to prove likewise that he is not, a Man; because every man may be free to sue for, and defend his right in our courts, says a stat. 20th Edw.  III. c. 4. and elsewhere, according to law.  And no man, of what estate or condition that he be, (here can be no exception whatsoever) shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer by due process of the law. 28th Edw.  III, c. 3, No man therefore, of what estate or condition that he be, can lawfully be detained in England as a slave; because we have no law whereby a man may be condemned to slavery without his own consent, (for even convicted felons must “in open court pray to transported.”) (See Habeas Corpus act, Sect. 14.) and therefore there cannot be any “due process of the law” tending to so base a purpose.  It follows therefore, that every man, who presumes to detain any person whatsoever as a slave, otherwise than by virtue of a written contract, acts manifestly without “due process of the law,” and consequently is liable to the slave’s “action of false imprisonment,” because “every man may be free to sue,” &c. so that the slave-holder cannot avail himself of his imaginary property, either by the assistance of the common law, or of a court of equity, (except it appears that the said slave has voluntarily bound himself, without compulsion or illegal duress) for in both his suit will certainly appear both unjust and indefensible.  The former cannot assist him, because the statute law at present is so far from supposing any man in a state of slavery, that it cannot even permit such a state, except in the two cases mentioned in the 13th and 14th Section of the Habeas Corpus act; and the courts of equity likewise must necessarily decide against him, because his mere mercenary plea of private property cannot equitably, in a case between man and man, stand in competition with that superior property which every man must necessarily be allowed to have in his own proper person.