led to a panic in a Dutch-Belgian brigade, which would have left the field but for the presence of Vandeleur’s cavalry, through which the men could not penetrate; and yet the panic-stricken men could not even see the soldiers before whose shouts they endeavored to fly!  The second column was partially supported, at first, by a body of cavalry; but it failed in consequence of a flank attack made by the Fifty-Second Regiment, which was aided by the operations of some other regiments, all belonging to General Adam’s brigade.  This attack on its left flank was assisted by the fire of a battery in front, and by the musketry of the British Guards on its right flank.  Thus assailed, the defeat of the second column was inevitable.  Had it been supported by cavalry, so that it could not have been attacked on either flank, it would have succeeded in its purpose.  Adam’s brigade followed up its success, and Vivian’s cavalry was ordered forward by Wellington, to check the French cavalry, should it advance, and to deal generally with the French reserves.  Adam and Vivian did their work so well that Wellington ordered his whole line of infantry to advance, supported by cavalry and artillery.  The French made considerable resistance after this, but their retreat became inevitable, and soon degenerated into a rout.  An exception to the general disorganization was observed by the victors, not unlike to an incident which we have seen mentioned in an account of the Bull Run flight.  In the midst of the crowd of fugitives on the 21st of July, and forcing its way through that crowd, was seen a company of infantry, marching as coolly and steadily as if on parade.  So it was after Waterloo, when the grenadiers a cheval moved off at a walk, “in close column, and in perfect order, as if disdaining to allow itself to be contaminated by the confusion that prevailed around it.”  It was unsuccessfully attacked, and the regiment “literally walked from the field in the most orderly manner, moving majestically along the stream, the surface of which was covered with the innumerable wrecks into which the rest of the French army had been scattered.”  It was supposed that this body of cavalry was engaged in protecting the retreat of the Emperor, and, had all the French been as cool and determined as were those veteran horsemen, the army might have been saved.  Troops in retreat, who hold firmly together, and show a bold countenance to the enemy, are seldom made to suffer much.]

The Russian War was not of a nature to afford room for the occurrence of any panic on an extensive scale, but between that contest and ours there is one point of resemblance that may be noted.  The failures and losses of the Allies, who had at their command unlimited means, and the bravest of soldiers in the greatest numbers, were all owing to bad management; and our reverses in every instance are owing to the same cause.  The disaster at Bull Run, and the inability of our men to keep the ground they had won at Wilson’s Creek, in Missouri, (August 10,) were the legitimate consequences of action over which the mass of the soldiers could have no control.  It is due to the soldiers to say this, for it is the truth, as every man knows who has observed the course of the contest, and who has seen it proceed from a political squabble to the dimensions of a mighty war, the end of which mortal vision cannot foresee.