This view was not long maintained.  All discerning persons were convinced of the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the high seas.  It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since the aggressor would have them at his disposal.  But this policy, it was thought, could be satisfied by half-measures.  The so-called Ausfallkorvetten were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the fact that we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank.  This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was a fresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that the costly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place a large number of torpedo-boats.  These, in spite of their small fighting capacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimed torpedoes.  It was soon realized that this theory rested on a fallacy—­that a country like the German Empire, which depends on an extensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growing population, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its political and economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea and on its coasts.  At last a standpoint had been reached which corresponded with actual needs.

The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the most inexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as already stated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in the midst of a great crisis in the world’s history, we must summon all our strength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughly effective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guard for our coasts.  We have at last come to see that the protection of our commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only object of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is an instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and supporting its justifiable ambitions.  There can be no question of such limited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence.  A few cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but in war the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, destroy the hostile fleet.  A direct protection of all trade lines is obviously impossible.  Commerce can only be protected indirectly by the defeat of the enemy.  A passive defence of the coast can never count on permanent success.  The American War of Secession, amongst others, showed that sufficiently.

The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals at sea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpeded commerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies.