“Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That a tract of country, not exceeding ten miles square, or any lesser quantity, to be located within the limits of the State, and in any part thereof, as Congress may, by law, direct, shall be, and the same is hereby for ever ceded and relinquished to the Congress and Government of the United States, in full and absolute right, and exclusive jurisdiction, as well of soil, as of persons residing or to reside thereon, pursuant to the tenor and effect of the eighth section of the first article of the government of the constitution of the United States.”

But were there no provisos to these acts?  The Maryland act had none.  That part of the District therefore, which includes the cities of Washington and Georgetown, can lay claim to nothing with which to ward off the power of Congress.  The Virginia act had this proviso:  “Sect. 2.  Provided, that nothing herein contained, shall be construed to vest in the United States any right of property in the soil, or to affect the rights of individuals therein, otherwise than the same shall or may be transferred by such individuals to the United States.”

This specification touching the soil was merely definitive and explanatory of that clause in the act of cession, “full and absolute right.” Instead of restraining the power of Congress on slavery and other subjects, it even gives it wider scope; for exceptions to parts of a rule, give double confirmation to those parts not embraced in the exceptions.  If it was the design of the proviso to restrict congressional action on the subject of slavery, why is the soil alone specified?  As legal instruments are not paragons of economy in words, might not “John Doe,” out of his abundance, and without spoiling his style, have afforded an additional word—­at least a hint—­that slavery was meant, though nothing was said about it?  The subject must have been too “delicate,” even for the most distant allusion!  The mystery of silence is solved!!

But again, Maryland and Virginia, in their acts of cession, declare them to be “in pursuance of” that clause of the constitution which gives to Congress “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over” the ten miles square—­thus, instead of restricting that clause, both States gave an express and decided confirmation of it.  Now, their acts of cession either accorded with that clause of the constitution, or they conflicted with it.  If they conflicted with it, accepting the cessions was a violation of the constitution.  If they accorded, the objector has already had his answer.  The fact that Congress accepted the cessions, proves that in its view their terms did not conflict with the constitutional grant of “power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District.”  The inquiry whether these acts of cession were consistent or inconsistent