Well, the voters in Boston, with this understanding, elect me to Congress, and I proceed to Washington.  But here arises a difficulty,—­my constituents at home have assented—­but when I get to Congress, I find I am not the representative of Boston only, but of the whole country.  The interests of Carolina are committed to my hands as well as those of Massachusetts; I find that the contract I made by my oath was not with Boston, but with the whole nation.  It is the nation that gives me the power to declare war and make peace—­to lay taxes on cotton, and control the commerce of New Orleans.  The nation prescribed the conditions in 1789, when the Constitution was settled, and though Boston may be willing to accept me on other terms, Carolina is not willing.  Boston has accepted my protest, and says, “Take office.”  Carolina says, “The oath you swear is sworn to me, as well as to the rest—­I demand the whole bond.”  In other words, when I have made my protest, what evidence is there that the nation, the other party to the contract, assents to it?  There can be none until that nation amends its Constitution.  Massachusetts when she accepted that Constitution, bound herself to send only such men as could swear to return slaves.  If by an underhand compromise with some of her citizens, she sends persons of other sentiments, she is perjured, and any one who goes on such an errand is a partner in the perjury.  Massachusetts has no right to assent to my protest—­she has no right to send representatives, except on certain conditions.  She cannot vary those conditions, without leave from those whose interests are to be affected by the change, that is, the whole nation.  Those conditions are written down in the Constitution.  Do she and South Carolina differ, as to the meaning?  The Court will decide for them.

But, says the objector, do you mean to say that I swear to support the Constitution, not as I understand it, but as some judge understands it?  Yes, I do—­otherwise there is no such thing as law.  This right of private judgment, for which he contends, exists in religion—­but not in Government.  Law is a rule prescribed.  The party prescribing must have the right to construe his own rule, otherwise there would be as many laws as there are individual consciences.  Statutes would be but recommendations if every man was at liberty to understand and obey them as he thought proper.  But I need not argue this.  The absurdity of a Government that has no right to govern—­and of laws which have no fixed meaning—­but which each man construes to mean what he pleases and obeys accordingly—­must be evident to every one.

What more power did the most despotic of the English Stuarts ask, than the right, after having sworn to laws, to break such as their consciences disapproved?  It is the essence of tyranny.

What is the Constitution of the United States?  In good old fashioned times we thought we knew, when we had read it and listened to the court’s exposition.  But we have improved upon that.  The Liberty party man says, it is for him “what he understands it.”  John C. Calhoun, of course, has the same right, and instead of “Liberty regulated by law,” we have liberty regulated by fourteen millions of understandings!