The justice of giving equal protection to the rights
of all, is maintained by those who support the most
outrageous inequality in the rights themselves.
Even in slave countries it is theoretically admitted
that the rights of the slave, such as they are, ought
to be as sacred as those of the master; and that a
tribunal which fails to enforce them with equal strictness
is wanting in justice; while, at the same time, institutions
which leave to the slave scarcely any rights to enforce,
are not deemed unjust, because they are not deemed
inexpedient. Those who think that utility requires
distinctions of rank, do not consider it unjust that
riches and social privileges should be unequally dispensed;
but those who think this inequality inexpedient, think
it unjust also. Whoever thinks that government
is necessary, sees no injustice in as much inequality
as is constituted by giving to the magistrate powers
not granted to other people. Even among those
who hold levelling doctrines, there are as many questions
of justice as there are differences of opinion about
expediency. Some Communists consider it unjust
that the produce of the labour of the community should
be shared on any other principle than that of exact
equality; others think it just that those should receive
most whose needs are greatest; while others hold that
those who work harder, or who produce more, or whose
services are more valuable to the community, may justly
claim a larger quota in the division of the produce.
And the sense of natural justice may be plausibly
appealed to in behalf of every one of these opinions.
Among so many diverse applications of the term Justice,
which yet is not regarded as ambiguous, it is a matter
of some difficulty to seize the mental link which
holds them together, and on which the moral sentiment
adhering to the term essentially depends. Perhaps,
in this embarrassment, some help may be derived from
the history of the word, as indicated by its etymology.
In most, if not in all languages, the etymology of
the word which corresponds to Just, points to an origin
connected either with positive law, or with that which
was in most cases the primitive form of law-authoritative
custom. Justum is a form of jussum, that
which has been ordered. Jus is of the same
origin. Dichanou comes from dichae,
of which the principal meaning, at least in the historical
ages of Greece, was a suit at law. Originally,
indeed, it meant only the mode or manner of
doing things, but it early came to mean the prescribed
manner; that which the recognized authorities, patriarchal,
judicial, or political, would enforce. Recht,
from which came right and righteous,
is synonymous with law. The original meaning,
indeed, of recht did not point to law, but
to physical straightness; as wrong and its
Latin equivalents meant twisted or tortuous; and from
this it is argued that right did not originally mean