Natural right is for Fichte, as for Kant, whose theory of right, moreover, appeared later than Fichte’s, entirely independent of ethics, and distinguished from the latter by its exclusive reference to external conduct instead of to the disposition and the will.  The rule of right gains from the moral law, it is true, new sanction for conscience, but cannot be derived from the law.—­The concept of right is to be deduced as a necessary act of the ego, i.e., to be shown a condition of self-consciousness.  The ego must posit itself as an individual, and can accomplish this only by positing itself in a relation of right to other finite rational beings; without a thou, no I. A finite rational being cannot posit itself without ascribing to itself a free activity in an external sense-world; and it cannot effect this latter unless (1) it ascribes free activity to other beings as well, hence not without assuming other finite rational beings outside itself, and positing itself as standing in the relation of right to them; and unless (2) it ascribes to itself a material body and posits this as standing under the influence of a person outside it.  But, further, Fichte considers it possible to deduce the particular constitution both of the external world and of the human body (as the sphere of all free actions possible to the person).  In the former there must be present a tough, durable matter capable of resistance, and light and air in order to the possibility of intercourse between spirits; while the latter must be an organized, articulated nature-product, furnished with senses, capable of infinite determination, and adapted to all conceivable motions.

If a community of free beings, such as has been shown the condition of individual self-consciousness, is to be possible, the following must hold as the law of right:  So limit thy freedom that others may be free along with thee.  This law is conditioned on the lawful behavior of others.  Where this is lacking, where my fellow does not recognize and treat me as a free, rational being, the right of coercion comes in; coercion, however, is not to be exercised by the individual himself—­since then there would be no guaranty either for its successful exercise or for the non-violation of the legal limit—­but devolves upon the state.  The state takes its origin in the common will of all to unite for the safeguarding of their rights, and determines by positive laws (intermediate between the law of right and legal judgments) what shall be considered rights.  Thus there result three subjects for natural right:  original rights or the sum of that which pertains to freedom or personality (inviolability of the body and of property), the right of coercion, and political right.  The aim of punishment is the reform of the evil doer and the deterrence of others.  Fichte is in agreement with Kant concerning the principle of popular sovereignty (Rousseau) and the exercise of the political power through representatives;