those who subsequently continued his endeavors, that thought arises from perception, that it is transformed sensation—­but in the wider sense, that thought is (free) operation with ideas, which are neither created by it nor present in it from the first, but given to it by perception, that, consequently, the cognitive process begins with sensation and so its first attitude is a passive one.  From the standpoint of the Cartesian problem, which he solves in a sense opposite to Descartes, Locke supplements the empiricism of Bacon by basing it on a psychologically developed theory of knowledge.  That in the course of the inquiry he introduces a new principle, which causes him to diverge from the true empirical path, will appear in the sequel.

The question “How our ideas come into the mind” receives a negative answer (in the first book of the Essay):  “There are no innate principles in the mind"[1] The doctrine of the innate character of certain principles is based on their universal acceptance.  The asserted agreement of mankind in regard to the laws of thought, the principles of morality, the existence of God, etc., is neither cogent as an argument nor correct in fact.  In the first place, even if there were any principles which everyone assented to, this would not prove that they had been created in the soul; the fact of general consent would admit of a different explanation.  Granted that no atheists existed, yet it would not necessarily follow that the universal conviction of the existence of God is innate, for it might have been gradually reached in each case through the use of the reason—­might have been inferred, for instance, from the perception of the purposive character of the world.  Second, the fact to which this theory of innate ideas appeals is not true.  No moral rule can be cited which is respected by all nations.  The idea of identity is entirely unknown to idiots and to children.  If the laws of identity and contradiction were innate they must appear in consciousness prior to all other truths; but long before a child is conscious of the proposition “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be,” it knows that sweet is not bitter, and that black is not white.  The ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts, but particular impressions of the senses.  Would nature write so illegible a hand that the mind must wait a long time before becoming able to read what had been inscribed upon it?  It is often said, however, that innate ideas and principles may be obscured and, finally, completely extinguished by habit, education, and other extrinsic circumstances.  Then, if they gradually become corrupted and disappear, they must at least be discoverable in full purity where these disturbing influences have not yet acted; but it is especially vain to look for them in children and the ignorant.  Perhaps, however, these possess such principles unconsciously; perhaps they are imprinted on the understanding, without being