Without allowing himself for a moment to believe that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will in any manner countenance the projected railroad from St. Andrews to Quebec when the slightest inspection of the map of the country which it crosses will show that its intended location would be for a great portion of the route an encroachment upon the territory in dispute between the United States and Great Britain, the President yet sees cause for painful surprise and deep regret in the fact that the civil authorities of His Majesty’s Provinces on our northeastern borders should have lent their encouragement to or should in any wise have promoted an undertaking which if persevered in will inevitably lead to the most disastrous consequences.  The object of the association from its inception was objectionable, since it could only be effected by entering upon territory the title to which was controverted and unsettled—­a proceeding which could not fail to be offensive to the Government and people of the United States.  Still more unjustifiable was the act of sovereignty giving to this company corporate powers over property known to be claimed by citizens of a friendly and neighboring State, and which constituted at the time the subject of an amicable negotiation between the Government of His Majesty and that of the United States.  The President regrets to see in this step on the part of His Majesty’s provincial authorities and subjects a most exceptionable departure from the principle of continuing to abstain during the progress of negotiation from any extension of the exercise of jurisdiction within the disputed territory on either side, the propriety of which has been hitherto so sedulously inculcated and so distinctly acquiesced in by both parties.  An understanding that this principle should be observed by them was the natural result of the respective positions and pacific intentions of the two Governments, and could alone prevent the exercise of asserted rights by force.  Without it the end of all negotiation on the subject would have been defeated.  If, therefore, nothing had been said by either party relative to such an understanding, it would have been proper to infer that a tacit agreement to that effect existed between the two Governments.  But the correspondence between them is sufficiently full and explicit to prevent all misconception.  The views of both Governments in respect to it will be found in the letters of the Secretary of State to the minister of Great Britain dated the 18th of January, 1826, 9th of January, 11th of March, and 11th of May, 1829, and of the British minister to the Secretary of State dated 15th of November and 2d of December, 1825; 16th of January, 1827; 18th of February and 25th of March, 1828, and 14th of April, 1833, as well as in other communications, which it is deemed needless now to designate.