in their internal and domestic matters which they had demanded, and that they would thus have become quite contented as subjects to the King of Denmark.  That desirable result, however, could not be brought about.  In reference to the Treaty of 1852, I have to repeat what I stated on a previous occasion—­that it was not a treaty of guarantee, that the Governments of France and Russia were competent to acknowledge the treaty, but that they had not pledged themselves to maintain the connexion of Schleswig and Denmark, that not being a question of the general balance of power in Europe.  Well, the French Government have frequently declared and have repeated to us only within the last twenty-four hours, that the Emperor does not consider it essential to the interest of France to support the line of the Schlei.  He declares he does not think that France would be inclined to go to war for such an object.  He urges that a war with Germany would be a most serious thing to France, that our armies would not be marshalled to oppose the invasion of Denmark, and that such a war would consequently be attended with great cost and great risk.  I think that if that war were successful, France would expect some compensation on account of her participation, and that compensation could hardly be granted without exciting general jealousy among the other nations of Europe, and thus disturbing the balance of power which now exists.  I cannot deny that if the Emperor of the French puts forward these considerations—­if he declares that for these reasons, though he would give us moral support, he would afford us no material assistance in such war—­I must say I think he is justified in that refusal, and in adopting such a line of conduct.  I cannot but admit that if a great war with Germany arose, whatever might be the issue, it might reproduce those great contests which took place in 1814, and which led to such unsatisfactory results.  The Emperor of the French is a Sovereign singularly wise and sagacious, and I will say valuing, as he has proved that he values, the peace of Europe, I am not in a position to find fault, nor can Her Majesty’s Government find any fault with the decision to which the Emperor has come.  But the Emperor of the French having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of Russia having constantly refused to join with us in affording material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly influenced by those decisions.  In the first place, is it the duty of this country—­if we are to undertake the preservation of the balance of power in Europe as it was recognized in 1852—­is it a duty incumbent on us alone?  The French Government sees very clearly the dangers to which France might be exposed by interfering, but it says at the same time that it would be an easy operation for England; that England, with her naval power, might add most materially to the strength of Denmark and assist in bringing the war to a conclusion.  My Lords, I must say there are many considerations which induce