By it, too, the motive for giving a forced or strained construction to any of the other specific grants will in most instances be diminished and in many utterly destroyed.  The importance of this consideration can not be too highly estimated, since, in addition to the examples already given, it ought particularly to be recollected that to whatever extent any specified power may be carried the right of jurisdiction goes with it, pursuing it through all its incidents.  The very important agency which this grant has in carrying into effect every other grant is a wrong argument in favor of the construction contended for.  All the other grants are limited by the nature of the offices which they have severally to perform, each conveying a power to do a certain thing, and that only, whereas this is coextensive with the great scheme of the Government itself.  It is the lever which raises and puts the whole machinery in motion and continues the movement.  Should either of the other grants fail in consequence of any condition or limitation attached to it or misconstruction of its powers, much injury might follow, but still it would be the failure of one branch of power, of one item in the system only.  All the others might move on.  But should the right to raise and appropriate the public money be improperly restricted, the whole system might be sensibly affected, if not disorganized.  Each of the other grants is limited by the nature of the grant itself; this, by the nature of the Government only.  Hence it became necessary that, like the power to declare war, this power should be commensurate with the great scheme of the Government and with all its purposes.

If, then, the right to raise and appropriate the public money is not restricted to the expenditures under the other specific grants according to a strict construction of their powers, respectively, is there no limitation to it?  Have Congress a right to raise and appropriate the money to any and to every purpose according to their will and pleasure?  They certainly have not.  The Government of the United States is a limited Government, instituted for great national purposes, and for those only.  Other interests are committed to the States, whose duty it is to provide for them.  Each government should look to the great and essential purposes for which it was instituted and confine itself to those purposes.  A State government will rarely if ever apply money to national purposes without making it a charge to the nation.  The people of the State would not permit it.  Nor will Congress be apt to apply money in aid of the State administrations for purposes strictly local in which the nation at large has no interest, although the State should desire it.  The people of the other States would condemn it.  They would declare that Congress had no right to tax them for such a purpose, and dismiss at the next election such of their representatives as had voted for the measure, especially if it should be severely felt.  I do not think that in offices of this kind there is much danger of the two Governments mistaking their interests or their duties.  I rather expect that they would soon have a clear and distinct understanding of them and move on in great harmony.