Among the first and most important effects of this great Revolution was the complete abolition of this pernicious policy.  The States were brought together by the Constitution as to commerce into one community equally in regard to foreign nations and each other.  The regulations that were adopted regarded us in both respects as one people.  The duties and imposts that were laid on the vessels and merchandise of foreign nations were all uniform throughout the United States, and in the intercourse between the States themselves no duties of any kind were imposed other than between different ports and counties within the same State.

This view is supported by a series of measures, all of a marked character, preceding the adoption of the Constitution.  As early as the year 1781 Congress recommended it to the States to vest in the United States a power to levy a duty of 5 per cent on all goods imported from foreign countries into the United States for the term of fifteen years.  In 1783 this recommendation, with alterations as to the kind of duties and an extension of this term to twenty-five years, was repeated and more earnestly urged.  In 1784 it was recommended to the States to authorize Congress to prohibit, under certain modifications, the importation of goods from foreign powers into the United States for fifteen years.  In 1785 the consideration of the subject was resumed, and a proposition presented in a new form, with an address to the States, explaining fully the principles on which a grant of the power to regulate trade was deemed indispensable.  In 1786 a meeting took place at Annapolis of delegates from several of the States on this subject, and on their report a convention was formed at Philadelphia the ensuing year from all the States, to whose deliberations we are indebted for the present Constitution.

In none of these measures was the subject of internal improvement mentioned or even glanced at.  Those of 1784, 1785, 1786, and 1787, leading step by step to the adoption of the Constitution, had in view only the obtaining of a power to enable Congress to regulate trade with foreign powers.  It is manifest that the regulation of trade with the several States was altogether a secondary object, suggested by and adopted in connection with the other.  If the power necessary to this system of improvement is included under either branch of this grant, I should suppose that it was the first rather than the second.  The pretension to it, however, under that branch has never been set up.  In support of the claim under the second no reason has been assigned which appears to have the least weight.