by the capture of Capua, a few days after.  Their affairs beyond sea also were equalized by a kind of compensation.  Philip had become their enemy at a juncture somewhat unseasonable; but then the Aetolians, and Attalus, king of Asia, were added to their allies; fortune now, in a manner, promising to the Romans the empire of the east.  The Carthaginians also set the loss of Capua against the capture of Tarentum; and as they considered it as glorious to them to have reached the walls of Rome without opposition, so they were chagrined at the failure of their attempt, and they felt ashamed that they had been held in such contempt, that while they lay under the walls of Rome, a Roman army was marched out for Spain at an opposite gate.  With regard also to Spain itself, the greater the reason was to hope that the war there was terminated, and that the Romans were driven from the country, after the destruction of two such renowned generals and their armies, so much the greater was the indignation felt, that the victory had been rendered void and fruitless by Lucius Marcius, a general irregularly appointed.  Thus fortune balancing events against each other, all was suspense and uncertainty on both sides, their hopes and their fears being as strong as though they were now first commencing the war.

38.  What grieved Hannibal more than any thing was the fact, that Capua having been more perseveringly besieged by the Romans than defended by him, had turned from him the regard of many of the states of Italy, and it was not only impossible for him to retain possession of all these by means of garrisons, unless he could make up his mind to tear his army into a number of small portions, which at that time was most inexpedient, but he could not, by withdrawing the garrisons, leave the fidelity of his allies open to the influence of hope, or subject to that of fear.  His disposition, which was strongly inclined to avarice and cruelty, induced him to plunder the places he could not keep possession of, that they might be left for the enemy in a state of desolation.  This resolution was equally horrid in principle and in its issue, for not only were the affections of those who suffered such harsh treatment alienated from him, but also of the other states, for the warning affected a greater number than did the calamity.  Nor did the Roman consul fail to sound the inclinations of the cities, whenever any prospect of success presented itself.  Dasius and Blasius were the principal men in Salapia, Dasius was the friend of Hannibal, Blasius, as far as he could do it with safety, promoted the Roman interest, and, by means of secret messengers, had given Marcellus hopes of having the place betrayed to him, but the business could not be accomplished without the assistance of Dasius.  After much and long hesitation and even then more for the want of a better plan than from any hope of success, he addressed himself to Dasius; but he, being both adverse to the measure