The German Government claim to have persevered to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna your successive proposals in the interest of peace.  Herr von Tchirsky abstained from inviting my co-operation or that of the French and Russian Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to that effect, and I had no means of knowing what response he was receiving from the Austro-Hungarian Government.  I was, however, kept fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with Count Berchtold.  M. Schebeko endeavoured on the 28th July to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Government to furnish Count Szapary with full powers to continue at St. Petersburgh the hopeful conversations which had there been taking place between the latter and M. Sazonof.  Count Berchtold refused at the time, but two days later (30th July), though in the meantime Russia had partially mobilised against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly friendly manner, and gave his consent to the continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburgh.  From now onwards the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria.  As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight, and on the 1st August I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count Szapary had at last conceded the main point at issue by announcing to M. Sazonof that Austria would consent to submit to mediation the points in the note to Servia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Servian independence.  M. Sazonof, M. Schebeko added, had accepted this proposal on condition that Austria would refrain from the actual invasion of Servia.  Austria, in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made to you on the 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither “banged the door” on compromise nor cut off the conversations.[192] M. Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace.  He was holding the most conciliatory language to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the latter, as well as Count Forgach, had responded in the same spirit.  Certainly it was too much for Russia to expect that Austria would hold back her armies, but this matter could probably have been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any reasonable compromise.

Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburgh and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia.  Germany intervened on the 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburgh and Paris.  The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible, and Germany declared war on Russia on the 1st August, and on France on the 3rd August.  A few days’ delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.