Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

If Servia should appeal to the Powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy.  It was possible, in his opinion, that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.

On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not precipitate war by mobilising until you had had time to use your influence in favour of peace, his Excellency assured me that Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action until it was forced on her.  Austria’s action was in reality directed against Russia.  She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony there.  He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her attitude was decided by ours.  If we took our stand firmly with France and Russia there would be no war.  If we failed them now, rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged into war.  I said that England could play the role of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia’s ally at once.  His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that she could count upon our neutrality.

I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilised, Germany would not be content with mere mobilisation, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once.  His Excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant Power in the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the risks of war.  He assured me once more that he did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate.

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—­(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 25, 1914.

Your telegram of the 24th July acted on.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs says that on receipt of a telegram at 10 this morning from German Ambassador at London, he immediately instructed German Ambassador at Vienna to pass on to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs your suggestion for an extension of time limit, and to speak to his Excellency about it.  Unfortunately it appeared from press that Count Berchtold is at Ischl, and Secretary of State thought that in these circumstances there would be delay and difficulty in getting time limit extended.  Secretary of State said that he did not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but he admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Servians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action.  He also admitted that Servian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands.

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.