a kind of tacitly accepted rule that the operation of British sea-power was to be felt in the enemy’s rather than in our own waters.  The hostile coast was regarded strategically as the British frontier, and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must be prevented from invading.  Acceptance of this principle led in time to the so-called ‘blockades’ of Brest and Toulon.  The name was misleading.  As Nelson took care to explain, there was no desire to keep the enemy’s fleet in; what was desired was to be near enough to attack it if it came out.  The wisdom of the plan is undoubted.  The hostile navy could be more easily watched and more easily followed if it put to sea.  To carry out this plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency than that of the enemy was necessary to us.  With the exception of that of American Independence, which will therefore require special notice, our subsequent great wars were conducted in accordance with the rule.

SEA-POWER IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AND EARLY PART OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

In the early part of the eighteenth century there was a remarkable manifestation of sea-power in the Baltic.  Peter the Great, having created an efficient army, drove the Swedes from the coast provinces south of the Gulf of Finland.  Like the earlier monarchies of which we have spoken, Russia, in the Baltic at least, now became a naval state.  A large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy established.  It was a purely artificial creation, and showed the merits and defects of its character.  At first, and when under the eye of its creator, it was strong; when Peter was no more it dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh.  It enabled Peter the Great to conquer the neighbouring portion of Finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate the Baltic.  In this he was assisted by the exhaustion of Sweden consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, the position of a quasi great power which she had held since the days of Gustavus Adolphus.  Sweden had been further weakened, especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with Denmark, which prevented all hope of Scandinavian predominance in the Baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy—­the modern German empire.

The war of the Spanish Succession left Great Britain a Mediterranean power, a position which, in spite of twice losing Minorca, she still holds.  In the war of the Austrian Succession, ’France was forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and England saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to use it to the best advantage.’[42] This shows, as we shall find that a later war showed more plainly, that even the Government of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting its naval affairs wisely.  The Seven Years’