When, therefore, a naval country’s coast is so near the ports of another naval country that the latter would be able with swift small craft to attack the former’s shipping, the provision of craft of a similar kind is likely to prove advantageous.  War between great powers is a two-sided game, and what one side can do the other will at least be likely to attempt.  Nothing supports the view that it is well—­either above or beneath the surface of the water—­to stand on the defensive and await attack.  Everything points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy’s quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his way towards his objective.  Consequently the only justification of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some of his bases within reach of those vessels’ efforts.  Where this condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent point of view, thrown away.  Here comes in the greatest foe of belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency.  In time of peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare to meet an enemy.  If local defence is thought to be pleasing to an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided, no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn out to be.

Not only is the British Empire the first of naval powers, it is also the first of colonial powers.  One attribute is closely connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be applicable.  The magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially the imposing aspects of some of its greater components—­the Dominion, the Commonwealth, South Africa, New Zealand—­are apt to blind us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our ocean lines of communication.  In thinking of the great daughter states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive.  By themselves, if not too numerous, they can afford valuable support to the naval operations that are likely to prove most beneficial to us.  The fact that they are ours, and not an opponent’s, also constitutes for us an advantage of importance.  Of course, they have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent’s hands.  Have we here a case in which highly localised or even passive defences are desirable?  No doubt we did act for a time as though we believed that the question could only be answered in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of land wars previously discussed.