148,000 N.I.
   24,000 King’s.
  -------
  172,000
   20,000 Native Cavalry.
    6,000 King’s.
  -------
  198,000

The out provisional battalions, local corps, &c., of 198,000, I do not think above 100,000 could possibly be disposable, and there would not be 70,000 effectives.  The Artillery must be very numerous.  I omitted the Company’s English Regiments, about 3,000 men.

Of all nations the Russians are the least adapted for an enterprise of this nature.  They have neither medical staff nor commissariat, and the men are without resource.  A French army would be the best.  I doubt the possibility of Russia bringing more than 20,000 men to Cabul, and these could not descend the mountains till the third year, if Cabul was occupied.  What I fear is an occupation of Khiva unknown to us.  No preparation on our part—­ no marching forward—­so that in three or four months from leaving Khiva the enemy might be at Cabul.  I am sure we can defeat the enterprise.  We ought to defeat it before the enemy reaches the Indus.  If 20,000 Russians should reach the Indus, it will be a sharp fight.

November 1, 1829.

A letter from the Duke.  He returned the papers I sent him.  He has doubts as to the expediency of making the Commissary-General of Stores I proposed; but he seems to have supposed I wished to do away with the Military Board.  I have explained what I meant.

He approves of my suggestions as to correspondence, but thinks every paper must be sent home, and the collections formed here.  I have explained that I always intended every paper should be sent home, and I have told him that I had the opinion of the clerks I consulted that the collections might be framed in India, with a saving of time, and without diminishing the check on the local Governments.

November 4.

Received from Aberdeen his draft of a remonstrance to Russia, which, it seems, must be sent at last.  He has already shown it to the Duke and Peel.

There is no great substantive objection to it; but it is not very carefully written.  I shall send it to him tomorrow with many proposed alterations.  In the second box came Gaily [Footnote:  H. Gaily Knight.  Best known for his works on the Normans in Sicily, and Ecclesiastical Architecture in Italy.] Knight’s letter to Aberdeen; which is a poor, flimsy production.  A peacock’s feather in the hilt of a Drawcansir’s sword.

November 5.

Altered, not only verbally, but substantially, Aberdeen’s paper, and sent it to him.

Cabinet room.  Read a Memorandum by Lord Heytesbury, of a conversation he has had with the Emperor of Russia.  The Emperor expects the early downfall of the Porte—­and a Revolution in France.  Asks if another march to Paris would be possible?  Lord Heytesbury saw Nesselrode afterwards and told him what the Emperor had said.  Nesselrode said the Emperor always saw things en noir.  He had a different opinion.  He did not think the Porte in immediate danger, nor did he expect a French Revolution.