We asked whether the permanent occupation of Constantinople by Russia was to be submitted to?  The answer was, No, to be opposed by war.  It seemed to me and to Fitzgerald we had better endeavour to prevent, at a small expense, even if alone, a measure we could only retrieve if it took place at an enormous expense, if at all, and which would in all probability effect the ruin of the Turkish Empire.  I did not think affairs quite so desperate.  I thought the Russians might get to Adrianople, but not to Constantinople, and that they could not maintain themselves at Adrianople without the command of the sea.  We had six ships at the mouth of the Dardanelles, and these with the Turkish Fleet would open the Black Sea.

I was for passing our ships up to Constantinople and placing them at the disposal of the Ambassador, for from hence we cannot give orders adapted to circumstances.  It was replied that would be war.  If war were to be declared we should do as much mischief as possible, and go to Cronstadt, not to the Black Sea.  We should have our ships beyond the Bosphorus when Russia occupied the Dardanelles, and shut us in.  This would make us ridiculous.

As the object is not to do mischief to Russia, but to save the Turkish Empire, I should say that measure was to be effected at the Bosphorus, for Constantinople, once taken, and the Ottoman Power annihilated, it would be of no use to distress Russia.

Fitzgerald seemed to be of my opinion that, however desperate the chance, we should do all we could to save Constantinople, and at any risk.

It was determined that our fleet in the Mediterranean should be reinforced by three or four line-of-battle ships, on the principle that wherever any Power had a large force, we should have one—­not a very wise principle, it seems to me, if we are never to use force.  I interceded for a few powerful steamers, with 68 pound carronades, and I think Lord Melville seemed inclined to acquiesce.

Questions are to be put to Polignac to ascertain what he would do in certain events.  I said he never would open himself to Lord Stuart.  It was then suggested by the Duke that Aberdeen could write a private letter.  This will, I believe, be done.  I said to Fitzgerald, who was next to me, ’Neither letter nor Stuart will get anything out of Polignac.  One of ourselves should go to Paris as an individual, see Polignac, and return before the Conference.’

I suggested Rosslyn, as he had nothing to do.  Fitzgerald said he could go and return in a week, and seemed to wish to do so.  However, nothing was said openly; and with all the means of success in our hands, for, I think, Polignac might be brought into our views, we shall lose all by not using proper instruments; just as we have lost the Greek question by persisting in keeping Stratford Canning.

We had a good deal of conversation as to the limits of Greece.  The Duke was for adhering to the Morea.  It was really the best line.  It was what we had guaranteed.  We had told the Turks we did not mean to go beyond it.