The King wishes to have Sir E. Barnes appointed provisional successor to Lord Dalhousie.  The Duke thinks him a better man than Sir R. O’Callaghan, who was suggested by Lord F. Somerset.  I suggested that it would be expedient to unite the influence of Governor-General with that of Commander-in-Chief, and make Lord William Bentinck provisional successor.  The Duke seemed to think Lord William could not execute both duties, and that it was better to adhere to the general usage of separating the two offices.  It seems that after Lord Hastings’ return the Court intimated a disposition to separate the offices in future.  I can do nothing against the King, the Duke, and the Horse Guards; but I am satisfied it would have been better to send Sir E. Barnes as second in command to the Governor-General.

The King (Lord F. Somerset told me) was desirous of doing away with the Company’s European regiments.  He could not do a better thing.  He has likewise some notion of bringing the army under himself.  The Duke thinks it must be a local army, and certainly it must. [Footnote:  In accordance with this view Lord Ellenborough opposed the eventual amalgamation of the Queen’s and the Indian army.] I believe it is better to make it an army of three Presidencies, not one army.  My doubt is whether it would not be advisable to allow exchanges from the King’s army to the Company’s.  Everything would be beneficial that raised the tone of the Indian army.

The Duke showed me a draft letter he had written for Aberdeen to Lord Stuart, informing the French Government that the King of the Netherlands had required the assistance of his allies to re-establish his authority in Belgium.  That it was as much the interest of France as of other Powers to put down a revolution not carried on by the higher or the middle, but by the lowest classes of the people.  That we were desirous of concerting with France, as one of the contracting parties to the Treaty of Vienna, what course should be now adopted.  It could not be supposed the Allies would forego the advantage of the union of Belgium and Holland for which they had sacrificed so much.

This was the substance of the letter.  It will not be sent without the concurrence of the Cabinet, which will be summoned the moment Peel comes to town, and he is hourly expected.

I think this letter prudent, inasmuch as whatever may happen it will place us in the right; but I do not expect that France will do anything against the rebels, or sanction the doing of anything.

The Duke considers, as indeed is clear enough, that it is idle to expect the future submission of Belgium to the King of the Netherlands.  It may be possible to place it under a Prince of the House of Nassau.  I do not think the Duke sees his way; but he expects war.

October 2.

Cabinet.  Aberdeen’s letter to Lord Stuart.  It is founded upon the Duke’s memorandum, but much extended a l’Indienne.  I think none approved of it but Lord Bathurst.  I objected to the statement that the treaty of 1815 imposed upon us obligations.  It may give us rights, but it imposes no obligation.  Then the principle of non-interference is advanced as just and wise, but there are peculiar circumstances attending the position of the Netherlands which make a difference.