“Besides this, all other bridges above New Bridge, and all the fords above that point, were open to us.”

To this General Magruder subsequently responded as follows: 

“New Bridge was finished on Friday evening, the 27th, instead of Saturday, 28th of June.

“I wrote from memory in reference to the time of its being finished.

“It was reported to me that the bridge three-quarters of a mile above was attempted to be crossed by troops (I think Ransom’s brigade), on Saturday morning, from the south to the north side, but that, finding the bridge or the approach to it difficult, they came down and crossed at New Bridge on the same morning.

“My statement in regard to these bridges was not intended as a criticism on General Lee’s plan, but to show the position of the troops, with a view to the proper understanding of my report, and to prove that the enemy might have reasonably entertained a design, after concentrating his troops, to march on Richmond.”

We shall not detain the reader by entering upon a full discussion of the interesting question here raised.  General Lee, as his observations on General Magruder’s report show, did not regard Richmond as exposed to serious danger, and was confident of his ability to recross the Chickahominy and go to its succor in the event of an attack on the city by General McClellan.  Had this prompt recrossing of the stream here, even, been impracticable, it may still be a question whether General Lee did not, in his movement against the Federal right wing with the bulk of his army, follow the dictates of sound generalship.  In war, something must be risked, and occasions arise which render it necessary to disregard general maxims.  It is one of the first principles of military science that a commander should always keep open his line of retreat; but the moment may come when his best policy is to burn the bridges behind him.  Of Lee’s movement against General McClellan’s right, it may be said that it was based on the broadest good sense and the best generalship.  The situation of affairs rendered an attack in some quarter essential to the safety of the capital, which was about to be hemmed in on all sides.  To attack the left of General McClellan, promised small results.  It had been tried and had failed; his right alone remained.  It was possible, certainly, that he would mass his army, and, crushing Magruder, march into Richmond; but it was not probable that he would make the attempt.  The Federal commander was known to be a soldier disposed to caution rather than audacity.  The small amount of force under General Magruder was a secret which he could not be expected to know.  That General Lee took these facts into consideration, as General Magruder intimates, may or may not have been the fact; and the whole discussion may be fairly summed up, perhaps, by saying that success vindicated the course adopted.  “Success, after all, is the test of merit,” said the brave Albert Sydney Johnston, and Talleyrand compressed much sound reasoning in the pithy maxim, “Nothing succeeds like success.”