Such a plan of operations, however, if ever seriously contemplated by Lee, was speedily abandoned.  He nowhere makes mention of any such design in his published reports, and he probably spoke of it only in jest.  His real aim in the great movement now about to commence, is stated with brevity and reserve—­then absolutely necessary—­but also with sufficient clearness, in his official report.  The position of the enemy opposite Fredericksburg was, he says, such as to render an attack upon him injudicious.  It was, therefore, desirable to manoeuvre him out of it—­force him to return toward Maryland—­and thus free the country of his forces.  A further result was expected from this movement.  The lower Shenandoah Valley was occupied by the enemy under General Milroy, who, with his headquarters at Winchester, harassed the whole region, which he ruled with a rod of iron.  With the withdrawal of the Federal army under General Hooker, and before the advance of the Confederates, General Milroy would also disappear, and the fertile fields of the Valley be relieved.  The whole force of the enemy would thus, says Lee, “be compelled to leave Virginia, and possibly to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country.”  He adds:  “In this way it was supposed that the enemy’s plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations and the preparations that they would require.  In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success,” that is to say, by a battle which Lee intended to fight when circumstances were favorable.  That he expected to fight, not merely to manoeuvre the enemy from Virginia, is apparent from another sentence of the report.  “It was thought,” he says, “that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army therein, commanded by General Hooker” the word “therein” referring to the region “north of the Potomac.”  In the phrase, “other valuable results which might be attained by military success,” the reference is plainly to the termination of the contest by a treaty of peace, based upon the independence of the South.

These sentences, taken from the only publication ever made by Lee on the subject of the Gettysburg campaign, express guardedly, but distinctly, his designs.  He aimed to draw General Hooker north of the Potomac, clear the Valley, induce the enemy to send troops in other quarters to the assistance of the main Federal army, and, when the moment came, attack General Hooker, defeat him if possible, and thus end the war.  That a decisive defeat of the Federal forces at that time in Maryland or Pennsylvania, would have virtually put an end to the contest, there seems good reason to believe.  Following the Southern victories