The recent rather alarming inflictions of penalties for blasphemy in England illustrate this point.  It was commonly supposed that the Blasphemy laws (see above, p. 139), though unrepealed, were a dead letter.  But since December, 1911, half a dozen persons have been imprisoned for this offence.  In these cases Christian doctrines were attacked by poor and more or less uneducated persons in language which may be described as coarse and offensive.  Some of the judges seem to have taken the line that it is not blasphemy to attack the fundamental doctrines provided “the decencies of controversy” are preserved, but that “indecent” attacks constitute blasphemy.  This implies a new definition of legal blasphemy, and is entirely contrary to the intention of the laws.  Sir

[245] J. F. Stephen pointed out that the decisions of judges from the time of Lord Hale (XVIIth century) to the trial of Foote (1883) laid down the same doctrine and based it on the same principle:  the doctrine being that it is a crime either to deny the truth of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion or to hold them up to contempt or ridicule; and the principle being that Christianity is a part of the law of the land.

The apology offered for such prosecutions is that their object is to protect religious sentiment from insult and ridicule.  Sir J. F. Stephen observed:  “If the law were really impartial and punished blasphemy only, because it offends the feelings of believers, it ought also to punish such preaching as offends the feelings of unbelievers.  All the more earnest and enthusiastic forms of religion are extremely offensive to those who do not believe them.”  If the law does not in any sense recognize the truth of Christian doctrine, it would have to apply the same rule to the Salvation Army.  In fact the law “can be explained and justified only on what I regard as its true principle—­the principle of persecution.”  The opponents of Christianity may justly say:  If Christianity is false, why is it to be attacked only in polite language?  Its goodness depends on its truth.  If you

[246] grant its falsehood, you cannot maintain that it deserves special protection.  But the law imposes no restraint on the Christian, however offensive his teaching may be to those who do not agree with him; therefore it is not based on an impartial desire to prevent the use of language which causes offence; therefore it is based on the hypothesis that Christianity is true; and therefore its principle is persecution.

Of course, the present administration of the common law in regard to blasphemy does not endanger the liberty of those unbelievers who have the capacity for contributing to progress.  But it violates the supreme principle of liberty of opinion and discussion.  It hinders uneducated people from saying in the only ways in which they know how to say it, what those who have been brought up differently say, with impunity, far more effectively and far more insidiously.  Some of the men who have been imprisoned during the last two years, only uttered in language of deplorable taste views that are expressed more or less politely in books which are in the library of a bishop unless he is a very ignorant person, and against which the law, if it has any validity, ought to have been enforced.  Thus the law, as now administered, simply penalizes bad taste and places disabilities