Accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones.  McPherson was ordered at daylight to move on Clinton, ten miles from Jackson; Sherman was notified of my determination to capture Jackson and work from there westward.  He was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to Raymond.  McClernand was ordered to march with three divisions by Dillon’s to Raymond.  One was left to guard the crossing of the Big Black.

On the 10th I had received a letter from Banks, on the Red River, asking reinforcements.  Porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and I now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops.  I looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held Port Hudson and Vicksburg as a waste of time and material.

General Joseph E. Johnston arrived at Jackson in the night of the 13th from Tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the Confederate troops in Mississippi.  I knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east.  On the 6th I had written to General Halleck:  “Information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma.”

Up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit.  Reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary.

McPherson reached Clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad.  Sherman’s advance reached Raymond before the last of McPherson’s command had got out of the town.  McClernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at Edward’s station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order.  On the night of the 13th, McPherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon Jackson, only fifteen miles away.  Sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from Raymond to Jackson, which is south of the road McPherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city.  McClernand was ordered to move one division of his command to Clinton, one division a few miles beyond Mississippi Springs following Sherman’s line, and a third to Raymond.  He was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by Mississippi Springs.  McClernand’s position was an advantageous one in any event.  With one division at Clinton he was in position to reinforce McPherson, at Jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond Mississippi Springs was equally available to reinforce Sherman; the one at Raymond could take either road.  He still had two other divisions farther back now that Blair had come up, available within a day at Jackson.  If this last command should not be wanted at Jackson, they were already one day’s march from there on their way to Vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city.  But the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting Pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear.  This I expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by Johnston to make this very move.