proceed to that which is matter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation; for if they possessed this power of adaptation in addition to those things, what would hinder them from being perfect?  But now since you think that you properly adapt the preconceptions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this (assume that you do so).  Because I think so.  But it does not seem so to another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper adaptation; or does he not think so?  He does think so.  Is it possible then that both of you can properly apply the preconceptions to things about which you have contrary opinions?  It is not possible.  Can you then show us anything better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your thinking that you do?  Does the madman do any other things than the things which seem to him right?  Is then this criterion sufficient for him also?  It is not sufficient.  Come then to something which is superior to seeming ([Greek:  tou dochein]).  What is this?

Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a perception of the disagreement of men with one another, and an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a condemnation and distrust of that which only “seems,” and a certain investigation of that which “seems” whether it “seems” rightly, and a discovery of some rule ([Greek:  chanonos]), as we have discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a carpenter’s rule (or square) in the case of straight and crooked things.—­This is the beginning of philosophy.  Must we say that all things are right which seem so to all?  And how is it possible that contradictions can be right?—­Not all then, but all which seem to us to be right.—­How more to you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more than what seem right to the Egyptians? why more than what seems right to me or to any other man?  Not at all more.  What then “seems” to every man is not sufficient for determining what “is”; for neither in the case of weights nor measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule.  In this matter then is there no rule superior to what “seems”?  And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered?  There is then some rule.  And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it?  For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere “seeming” as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) known and made clear we may use in the case of particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.