He that hath names without ideas, wants meaning in his words, and speaks only empty sounds.  He that hath complex ideas without names for them, wants liberty and dispatch in his expressions, and is necessitated to use periphrases.  He that uses his words loosely and unsteadily will either be not minded or not understood.  He that applies his names to ideas different from their common use, wants propriety in his language, and speaks gibberish.  And he that hath the ideas of substances disagreeing with the real existence of things, so far wants the materials of true knowledge in his understanding, and hath instead thereof chimeras.

32.  How men’s words fail when they stand for Substances.

In our notions concerning Substances, we are liable to all the former inconveniences:  v. g. he that uses the word tarantula, without having any imagination or idea of what it stands for, pronounces a good word; but so long means nothing at all by it. 2.  He that, in a newly-discovered country, shall see several sorts of animals and vegetables, unknown to him before, may have as true ideas of them, as of a horse or a stag; but can speak of them only by a description, till he shall either take the names the natives call them by, or give them names himself. 3.  He that uses the word body sometimes for pure extension, and sometimes for extension and solidity together, will talk very fallaciously. 4.  He that gives the name horse to that idea which common usage calls mule, talks improperly, and will not be understood. 5.  He that thinks the name centaur stands for some real being, imposes on himself, and mistakes words for things.

33.  How when they stand for Modes and Relations.

In Modes and Relations generally, we are liable only to the four first of these inconveniences; viz. 1.  I may have in my memory the names of modes, as gratitude or charity, and yet not have any precise ideas annexed in my thoughts to those names, 2.  I may have ideas, and not know the names that belong to them:  v. g.  I may have the idea of a man’s drinking till his colour and humour be altered, till his tongue trips, and his eyes look red, and his feet fail him; and yet not know that it is to be called drunkenness. 3.  I may have the ideas of virtues or vices, and names also, but apply them amiss:  v. g. when I apply the name frugality to that idea which others call and signify by this sound, covetousness. 4.  I may use any of those names with inconstancy. 5.  But, in modes and relations, I cannot have ideas disagreeing to the existence of things:  for modes being complex ideas, made by the mind at pleasure, and relation being but by way of considering or comparing two things together, and so also an idea of my own making, these ideas can scarce be found to disagree with anything existing; since they are not in the mind as the copies of things regularly made by nature, nor as properties inseparably flowing