was so fit, either for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make.  Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that purpose, came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas; not by any natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a voluntary imposition, whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea.  The use, then, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.

2.  Words, in their immediate Signification, are the sensible Signs of his Ideas who uses them.

The use men have of these marks being either to record their own thoughts, for the assistance of their own memory; or, as it were, to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others:  words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed to represent.  When a man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood:  and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer.  That then which words are the marks of are the ideas of the speaker:  nor can any one apply them as marks, immediately, to anything else but the ideas that he himself hath:  for this would be to make them signs of his own conceptions, and yet apply them to other ideas; which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time; and so in effect to have no signification at all.  Words being voluntary signs, they cannot be voluntary signs imposed by him on things he knows not.  That would be to make them signs of nothing, sounds without signification.  A man cannot make his words the signs either of qualities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another, whereof he has none in his own.  Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot suppose them to correspond with the conceptions of another man; nor can he use any signs for them:  for thus they would be the signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the signs of nothing.  But when he represents to himself other men’s ideas by some of his own, if he consent to give them the same names that other men do, it is still to his own ideas; to ideas that he has, and not to ideas that he has not.

3.  Examples of this.