4.  And that eternal Being must be most powerful.

Next, it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another, must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too.  All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source.  This eternal source, then, of all being must also be the source and original of all power; and so this eternal being must be also the most powerful.

5.  And most knowing.

Again, a man finds in himself perception and knowledge.  We have then got one step further; and we are certain now that there is not only some being, but some knowing, intelligent being in the world.  There was a time, then, when there was no knowing being, and when knowledge began to be; or else there has been also A knowing being from eternity.  If it be said, there was a time when no being had any knowledge, when that eternal being was void of all understanding; I reply, that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge:  it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones.  For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter, that it should put into itself sense, perception, and knowledge, as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle, that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones.

6.  And therefore God.

Thus, from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth,—­that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; which whether any one will please to call God, it matters not.  The thing is evident; and from this idea duly considered, will easily be deduced all those other attributes, which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. [If, nevertheless, any one should be found so senselessly arrogant, as to suppose man alone knowing and wise, but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance; and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard; I shall leave with him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1. ii.  De Leg.), to be considered at his leisure:  ’What can be more sillily arrogant and misbecoming, than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him, but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing?  Or that those things, which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend, should be moved and managed without any reason at all?’ Quid EST ENIM VERIUS, Quam NEMINEM ESSE OPORTERE Tam STULTE AROGANTEM, UT in Se MENTEM et RATIONEM PUTET INESSE in COELO MUNDOQUE non PUTET?  AUT EA QUOE viz Summa INGENII RATIONE COMPREHENDAT, NULLA RATIONE MOVERI PUTET?]