2.  Where in that Self-evidence consists.

Knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas.  Now, where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other, there our knowledge is self-evident.  This will appear to be so to any who will but consider any of those propositions which, without any proof, he assents to at first sight:  for in all of them he will find that the reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition.

3.  Self evidence not peculiar to received Axioms.

This being so, in the next place, let us consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them.  And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence.  This we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I have above mentioned, viz. identity, relation, co-existence, and real existence; which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but a great many, even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such.

4.  As to Identity and Diversity all Propositions are equally self-evident.

I. For, first, The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity being founded in the mind’s having distinct ideas, this affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas.  Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas:  and it is the first act of the mind (without which it can never be capable of any knowledge) to know every one of its ideas by itself, and distinguish it from others.  Every one finds in himself, that he knows the ideas he has; that he knows also, when any one is in his understanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly one from another; which always being so, (it being impossible but that he should perceive what he perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is; and that two distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea.  So that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty, or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood; that is, as soon as we have in our minds [determined ideas,] which the terms in the proposition stand for. [And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms,