An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 516 pages of information about An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1.

An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 516 pages of information about An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1.
I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies, having but a very obscure one of either of them.  So that, I think, when we talk of division of bodies in infinitum, our idea of their distinct bulks, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little progression, to be confounded, and almost lost in obscurity.  For that idea which is to represent only bigness must be very obscure and confused, which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big, but only by number:  so that we have clear distinct ideas, we may say, of ten and one, but no distinct ideas of two such extensions.  It is plain from hence, that, when we talk of infinite divisibility of body or extension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers:  but the clear distinct ideas of extension, after some progress of division, are quite lost; and of such minute parts we have no distinct ideas at all; but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added; but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual infinite parts.  We have, it is true, a clear idea of division, as often as we think of it; but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter, than we have a clear idea of an infinite number, by being able still to add new numbers to any assigned numbers we have:  endless divisibility giving us no more a clear and distinct idea of actually infinite parts, than endless addibility (if I may so speak) gives us a clear and distinct idea of an actually infinite number:  they both being only in a power still of increasing the number, be it already as great as it will.  So that of what remains to be added (wherein consists the infinity) we have but an obscure, imperfect, and confused idea; from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of which we have no such distinct idea as we have of 4 or 100; but only this relative obscure one, that, compared to any other, it is still bigger:  and we have no more a clear positive idea of it, when we [dropped line*] than if we should say it is bigger than 40 or 4:  400,000,000 having no nearer a proportion to the end of addition or number than 4.  For he that adds only 4 to 4, and so proceeds, shall as soon come to the end of all addition, as he that adds 400,000,000 to 400,000,000.  And so likewise in eternity; he that has an idea of but four years, has as much a positive complete idea of eternity, as he that has one of 400,000,000 of years:  for what remains of eternity beyond either of these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other; i.e. neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all.  For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on; or, if he please,
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An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.