3.  Artificial things that are made up of distinct substances are our collective Ideas.

Amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things, at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances:  and, in truth, if we consider all these collective ideas aright, as army, Constellation, universe, as they are united into so many single ideas, they are but the artificial draughts of the mind; bringing things very remote, and independent on one another, into one view, the better to contemplate and discourse on them, united into one conception, and signified by one name.  For there are no things so remote, nor so contrary, which the mind cannot, by this art of composition, bring into one idea; as is visible in that signified by the name universe.

CHAPTER XXV.

Of relation.

1.  Relation, what.

Besides the ideas, whether simple or complex, that the mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are others it gets from their comparison one with another.  The understanding, in the consideration of anything, is not confined to that precise object:  it can carry any idea as it were beyond itself, or at least look beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to any other.  When the mind so considers one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from one to the other—­this is, as the words import, relation and respect; and the denominations given to positive things, intimating that respect, and serving as marks to lead the thoughts beyond the subject itself denominated, to something distinct from it, are what we call relatives; and the things so brought together, related. Thus, when the mind considers Caius as such a positive being, it takes nothing into that idea but what really exists in Caius; v.g. when I consider him as a man, I have nothing in my mind but the complex idea of the species, man.  So likewise, when I say Caius is a white man, I have nothing but the bare consideration of a man who hath that white colour.  But when I give Caius the name husband, I intimate some other person; and when I give him the name whiter, I intimate some other thing:  in both cases my thought is led to something beyond Caius, and there are two things brought into consideration.  And since any idea, whether simple or complex, may be the occasion why the mind thus brings two things together, and as it were takes a view of them at once, though still considered as distinct:  therefore any of our ideas may be the foundation of relation.  As in the above-mentioned instance, the contract and ceremony of marriage with Sempronia is the occasion of the denomination and relation of husband; and the colour white the occasion why he is said to be whiter than free-stone.

2.  Ideas of relations without correlative Terms, not easily apprehended.