But, which way ever it be, either by placing it where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not necessary to it;—­when a man misses his great end, happiness, he will acknowledge he judged not right.  That which contributes to this mistake is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the actions which are the way to this end; it seeming so preposterous a thing to men, to make themselves unhappy in order to happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

71.  We can change the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness in Things.

The last inquiry, therefore, concerning this matter is,—­Whether it be in a man’s power to change the pleasantness and unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of action?  And as to that, it is plain, in many cases he can.  Men may and should correct their palates, and give relish to what either has, or they suppose has none.  The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change the displeasingness or indifferency that is in actions into pleasure and desire, if they will do but what is in their power.  A due consideration will do it in some cases; and practice, application, and custom in most.  Bread or tobacco may be neglected where they are shown to be useful to health, because of an indifferency or disrelish to them; reason and consideration at first recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant.  That this is so in virtue too, is very certain.  Actions are pleasing or displeasing, either in themselves, or considered as a means to a greater and more desirable end.  The eating of a well-seasoned dish, suited to a man’s palate, may move the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end; to which the consideration of the pleasure there is in health and strength (to which that meat is subservient) may add a new gusto, able to make us swallow an ill-relished potion.  In the latter of these, any action is rendered more or less pleasing, only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or less persuaded of its tendency to it, or necessary connexion with it:  but the pleasure of the action itself is best acquired or increased by use and practice.  Trials often reconcile us to that, which at a distance we looked on with aversion; and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what possibly, in the first essay, displeased us.  Habits have powerful charms, and put so strong attractions of easiness and pleasure into what we accustom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be easy in the omission of, actions, which habitual practice has suited, and thereby recommends to us.  Though this be very visible, and every one’s experience shows him he can do so; yet it is a part in the conduct of men towards their happiness, neglected to a degree, that it will be possibly entertained as a paradox, if it be said, that men can make things or actions