of the alteration of its figure by the same blow is an action.  The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves; where we find by experience, that, barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest.  So that it seems to me, we have, from the observation of the operation of bodies by our senses, but a very imperfect obscure idea of active power; since they afford us not any idea in themselves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought.  But if, from the impulse bodies are observed to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it serves as well to my purpose; sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas:  only I thought it worth while to consider here, by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations, than it doth from any external sensation.

5.  Will and Understanding two Powers in Mind or Spirit.

This, at least, I think evident,—­That we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or as it were commanding, the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.  This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will.  The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing.  The forbearance of that action, consequent to such order or command of the mind, is called voluntary.  And whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind, is called involuntary.  The power of perception is that which we call the understanding.  Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three sorts:—­1.  The perception of ideas in our minds. 2.  The perception of the:  signification of signs. 3.  The perception of the connexion or repugnancy, agreement or disagreement, that there is between any of our ideas.  All these are attributed to the understanding, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand.

6.  Faculties not real beings.

These powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving, and of preferring, are usually called by another name.  And the ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used, as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men’s thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performed those