These two last, envy and anger, not being caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts, of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them.  But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men.  For we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately.  In fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them.  Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us; because the fear it leaves is a constant pain:  but we do not so constantly love what has done us good; because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again.  But this by the by.

15.  Pleasure and Pain, what.

By pleasure and pain, delight and uneasiness, I must all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatsoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arising from any grateful or unacceptable sensation or reflection.

16.  Removal or lessening of either.

It is further to be considered, that, in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates, as a pleasure:  and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

17.  Shame.

The passions too have most of them, in most persons, operations on the body, and cause various changes in it; which not being always sensible, do not make a necessary part of the idea of each passion.  For shame, which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

18.  These Instances to show how our Ideas of the Passions are got from Sensation and Reflection.

I would not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a Discourse of the Passions; they are many more than those I have here named:  and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse.  I have only mentioned these here, as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil.  I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain, more simple than these; as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them:  the pain of teeth set on edge; the pleasure of music; pain from captious uninstructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth.  But the passions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to instance in them, and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or reflection.