the Carthaginian prisoners, who had been taken in the war, they were retained in servitude: not upon the principles of reparation and punishment, because the Romans had already received, by their own confession in the treaty, a sufficient satisfaction:  not upon these principles, because they were inapplicable to individuals: the legionary soldier in the service of the injured, who took his prisoner, was not the person, to whom the injury had been done, any more than the soldier in the service of the aggressors, who was taken, was the person, who had committed the offence: but they were retained in servitude by the right of capture; because, when both parties had sent their military into the field to determine the dispute, it was at the private choice of the legionary soldier before-mentioned, whether he would spare the life of his conquered opponent, when he was thought to be entitled to take it, if he had chosen, by the laws of war.

To produce more instances, as an illustration of the subject, or to go farther into the argument, would be to trespass upon the patience, as well as understanding of the reader.  In a state of nature, where a man is supposed to commit an injury, and to be unconnected with the rest of the world, the act is private, and the right, which the injured acquires, can extend only to himself: but in a state of society, where any member or members of a particular community give offence to those of another, and they are patronized by the state, to which they belong, the case is altered; the act becomes immediately publick, and the publick alone are to experience the consequences of their injustice.  For as no particular member of the community, if considered as an individual, is guilty, except the person, by whom the injury was done, it would be contrary to reason and justice, to apply the principles of reparation and punishment, which belong to the people as a collective body, to any individual of the community, who should happen to be taken.  Now, as the principles of reparation and punishment are thus inapplicable to the prisoners, taken in a publick war, and as the right of capture, as we have shewn before, is insufficient to intitle the victors to the service of the vanquished, it is evident that slavery cannot justly exist at all, since there are no other maxims, on which it can be founded, even in the most equitable wars.

But if these things are so; if slavery cannot be defended even in the most equitable wars, what arguments will not be found against that servitude, which arises from those, that are unjust? Which arises from those African wars, that relate to the present subject?  The African princes, corrupted by the merchants of Europe, seek every opportunity of quarrelling with one another.  Every spark is blown into a flame; and war is undertaken from no other consideration, than that of procuring slaves: while the Europeans, on the other hand, happy in the quarrels which they have thus excited, supply them with arms and ammunition for the accomplishment of their horrid purpose.  Thus has Africa, for the space of two hundred years, been the scene of the most iniquitous and bloody wars; and thus have many thousands of men, in the most iniquitous manner, been sent into servitude.