to gain French support for the League the proposer of the alliance was willing to destroy the chief feature of the League.  It seemed to me that here was utter blindness as to the consequences of such action.  There appears to have been no thought given as to the way other nations, like Poland, Bohemia, and the Southern Slavs, would view the formation of an alliance to protect France and Belgium alone.  Manifestly it would increase rather than decrease their danger from Germany since she would have to look eastward and southward for expansion.  Of course they would not accept as sufficient the guaranty in the Covenant when France and Belgium declined to do it.

“How would such a proposal be received in the United States with its traditional policy of avoiding ‘entangling alliances’?  Of course, when one considers it, the proposal is preposterous and would be laughed at and rejected.”

This was the impression made upon me at the time that this triple alliance against Germany was first proposed.  I later came to look upon it more seriously and to recognize the fact that there were some valid reasons in favor of the proposal.  The subject was not further discussed by the Commissioners for several weeks, but it is clear from what followed that M. Clemenceau, who naturally favored the idea, continued to press the President to agree to the plan.  What arguments were employed to persuade him I cannot say, but, knowing the shrewdness of the French Premier in taking advantage of a situation, my belief is that he threatened to withdraw or at least gave the impression that he would withdraw his support of the League of Nations or else would insist on a provision in the Covenant creating a general staff and an international military force and on a provision in the treaty establishing a Rhenish Republic or else ceding to France all territory west of the Rhine.  To avoid the adoption of either of these provisions, which would have endangered the approval of his plan for world organization, the President submitted to the French demand.  At least I assume that was the reason, for he promised to enter into the treaty of assistance which M. Clemenceau insisted should be signed.

It is of course possible that he was influenced in his decision by the belief that the knowledge that such an agreement existed would be sufficient to deter Germany from even planning another invasion of France, but my opinion is that the desire to win French support for the Covenant was the chief reason for the promise that he gave.  It should be remembered that at the time both the Italians and Japanese were threatening to make trouble unless their territorial ambitions were satisfied.  With these two Powers disaffected and showing a disposition to refuse to accept membership in the proposed League of Nations the opposition of France to the Covenant would have been fatal.  It would have been the end of the President’s dream of a world organized to maintain peace by an international guaranty of national boundaries and sovereignties.  Whether France would in the end have insisted on the additional guaranty of protection I doubt, but it is evident that Mr. Wilson believed that she would and decided to prevent a disaster to his plan by acceding to the wishes of his French colleague.