On the two days succeeding the one when I handed the President my draft of articles I had long conferences with Lord Robert Cecil and Colonel House.  Previous to these conferences, or at least previous to the second one, I examined Lord Robert’s plan for a League.  His plan was based on the proposition that the Supreme War Council, consisting of the Heads of States and the Secretaries and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Five Great Powers, should be perpetuated as a permanent international body which should meet once a year and discuss subjects of common interest.  That is, he proposed the formation of a Quintuple Alliance which would constitute itself primate over all nations and the arbiter in world affairs, a scheme of organization very similar to the one proposed by General Smuts.

Lord Robert made no attempt to disguise the purpose of his plan.  It was intended to place in the hands of the Five Powers the control of international relations and the direction in large measure of the foreign policies of all nations.  It was based on the power to compel obedience, on the right of the powerful to rule.  Its chief merit was its honest declaration of purpose, however wrong that purpose might appear to those who denied that the possession of superior might conferred special rights upon the possessor.  It seemed to provide for a rebirth of the Congress of Vienna which should be clothed in the modern garb of democracy.  It could only be interpreted as a rejection of the principle of the equality of nations.  Its adoption would mean that the destiny of the world would be in the hands of a powerful international oligarchy possessed of dictatorial powers.

There was nothing idealistic in the plan of Lord Robert Cecil, although he was reputed to be an idealist favoring a new international order.  An examination of his plan (Appendix) shows it to be a substantial revival of the old and discredited ideas of a century ago.  There could be no doubt that a plan of this sort, materialistic and selfish as it was, would win the approval and cordial support of M. Clemenceau, since it fitted in with his public advocacy of the doctrine of “the balance of power.”  Presumably the Italian delegates would not be opposed to a scheme which gave Italy so influential a voice in international affairs, while the Japanese, not averse to this recognition of their national power and importance, would unquestionably favor an alliance of this nature.  I think that it is fair to assume that all of the Five Great Powers would have readily accepted the Cecil plan—­all except the United States.