told him that I was disturbed by this fact because I was afraid the Senate and possibly the people, if they understood this, would refuse ratification, and that anything which was an obstacle to ratification was unfortunate because we ought to have peace as soon as possible.”

It is very easy to see how by making a record of one side of this conversation without reference to the other side and by an omission here and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered.  Thus Mr. Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said.  My attitude was, and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification, was to be deplored.

Having submitted to the President the question of making a public explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so until I received the President’s approval.  That was never received.  The telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State, was never answered.  It was not even acknowledged.  The consequence was that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only one that up to the present time has been published.

The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President’s silence is that he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt’s account of what had taken place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations.  I am not disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering what had taken place at Paris.  From his point of view a statement, such as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation.  I would still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty, provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses.  While Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial, his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be undone.  I am inclined to think that he was right.

My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr. Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is as follows: 

“The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish rush of preparation there is time to consider the Treaty as a complete document.

   “The impression made by it is one of disappointment, of regret, and
   of depression.  The terms of peace appear immeasurably harsh and
   humiliating, while many of them seem to me impossible of performance.