While this view of the extinguishment of the German rights in Shantung was manifestly the just one and its adoption would make for the preservation of permanent peace in the Far East, the Governments of the Allied Powers had, early in 1917, and prior to the severance of diplomatic relations between China and Germany, acceded to the request of Japan to support, “on the occasion of the Peace Conference,” her claims in regard to these rights which then existed.  The representatives of Great Britain, France, and Italy at Paris were thus restricted, or at least embarrassed, by the promises which their Governments had made at a time when they were in no position to refuse Japan’s request.  They might have stood on the legal ground that the Treaty of 1898 having been abrogated by China no German rights in Shantung were in being at the time of the Peace Conference, but they apparently were unwilling to take that position.  Possibly they assumed that the ground was one which they could not take in view of the undertakings of their Governments; or possibly they preferred to let the United States bear the brunt of Japanese resentment for interfering with the ambitious schemes of the Japanese Government in regard to China.  There can be little doubt that political, and possibly commercial, interests influenced the attitude of the European Powers in regard to the Shantung Question.

President Wilson and the American Commissioners, unhampered by previous commitments, were strongly opposed to acceding to the demands of the Japanese Government.  The subject had been frequently considered during the early days of the negotiations and there seemed to be no divergence of views as to the justice of the Chinese claim of right to the resumption of full sovereignty over the territory affected by the lease and the concessions to Germany.  These views were further strengthened by the presentation of the question before the Council of Ten.  On January 27 the Japanese argued their case before the Council, the Chinese delegates being present; and on the 28th Dr. V.K.  Wellington Koo spoke on behalf of China.  In a note on the meeting I recorded that “he simply overwhelmed the Japanese with his argument.”  I believe that that opinion was common to all those who heard the two presentations.  In fact it made such an impression on the Japanese themselves, that one of the delegates called upon me the following day and attempted to offset the effect by declaring that the United States, since it had not promised to support Japan’s contention, would be blamed if Kiao-Chau was returned directly to China.  He added that there was intense feeling in Japan in regard to the matter.  It was an indirect threat of what would happen to the friendly relations between the two countries if Japan’s claim was denied.