The cases were different.  No matter what action was taken by Italy she would have continued to be a Great Power in any organization of the world based on a classification of the nations.  If she did not enter the League under the German Treaty, she certainly would later and would undoubtedly hold an influential position in the organization whether her delegates signed the Covenant or accepted it in another treaty or by adherence.  It was not so with Japan.  There were reasons to believe that, if she failed to become one of the Principal Powers at the outset, another opportunity might never be given her to obtain so high a place in the concert of the nations.  The seats that her delegates had in the Council of Ten had caused criticism and dissatisfaction in certain quarters, and the elimination of a Japanese from the Council of the Heads of States showed that the Japanese position as an equal of the other Great Powers was by no means secure.  These indications of Japan’s place in the international oligarchy must have been evident to her plenipotentiaries at Paris, who in all probability reported the situation to Tokio.  From the point of view of policy the execution of the threat of withdrawal presented dangers to Japan’s prestige which the diplomats who represented her would never have incurred if they were as cautious and shrewd as they appeared to be.  The President did not hold this opinion.  We differed radically in our judgment as to the sincerity of the Japanese threat.  He showed that he believed it would be carried out.  I believed that it would not be.

It has not come to my knowledge what the attitude of the British and French statesmen was concerning the disposition of the Shantung rights, although I have read the views of certain authors on the subject, but I do know that the actual decision lay with the President.  If he had declined to recognize the Japanese claims, they would never have been granted nor would the grant have been written into the Treaty.  Everything goes to show that he realized this responsibility and that the cession to Japan was not made through error or misconception of the rights of the parties, but was done deliberately and with a full appreciation that China was being denied that which in other circumstances would have been awarded to her.  If it had not been for reasons wholly independent and outside of the question in dispute, the President would not have decided as he did.

It is not my purpose to enter into the details of the origin of the German lease of Kiao-Chau (the port of Tsingtau) and of the economic concessions in the Province of Shantung acquired by Germany.  Suffice it to say that, taking advantage of a situation caused by the murder of some missionary priests in the province, the German Government in 1898 forced the Chinese Government to make treaties granting for the period of ninety-nine years the lease and concessions, by which the sovereign authority over this “Holy Land” of China was to all intents ceded to Germany, which at once improved the harbor, fortified the leased area, and began railway construction and the exploitation of the Shantung Peninsula.