“I am sure now that there will be no preliminary treaty of peace, but that the treaty will be complete and definitive.  This is a serious mistake.  Time should be given for passions to cool.  The operations of a preliminary treaty should be tested and studied.  It would hasten a restoration of peace.  Certainly this is the wise course as to territorial settlements and the financial and economic burdens to be imposed upon Germany.  The same comment applies to the organization of a League of Nations.  Unfortunately the President insists on a full-blown Covenant and not a declaration of principles.  This has much to do with preventing a preliminary treaty, since he wishes to make the League an agent for enforcement of definite terms.

“When the President departed for the United States in February, I assumed and I am certain that he had in mind that there would be a preliminary treaty.  With that in view I drafted at the time a memorandum setting forth what the preliminary treaty of peace should contain.  Here are the subjects I then set down: 

   “1.  Restoration of Peace and official relations.

   “2.  Restoration of commercial and financial relations subject to
   conditions.

   “3.  Renunciation by Germany of all territory and territorial rights
   outside of Europe.

   “4.  Minimum territory of Germany in Europe, the boundaries to be
   fixed in the Definitive Treaty.

   “5.  Maximum military and naval establishments and production of arms
   and munitions.

   “6.  Maximum amount of money and property to be surrendered by Germany
   with time limits for payment and delivery.

   “7.  German property and territory to be held as security by the
   Allies until the Definitive Treaty is ratified.

   “8.  Declaration as to the organization of a League of Nations.

“The President’s obsession as to a League of Nations blinds him to everything else.  An immediate peace is nothing to him compared to the adoption of the Covenant.  The whole world wants peace.  The President wants his League.  I think that the world will have to wait.”

The eight subjects, above stated, were the ones which I called to the President’s attention at the time he was leaving Paris for the United States and which he said he did not care to discuss.

The views that are expressed in the memorandum of March 30 are those that I have continued to hold.  The President was anxious to have the Treaty, even though preliminary in character, contain detailed rather than general provisions, especially as to the League of Nations.  With that view I entirely disagreed, as detailed terms of settlement and the articles of the Covenant as proposed would cause discussion and unquestionably delay the peace.  To restore the peaceful intercourse between the belligerents, to open the long-closed channels of commerce, and to