Whatever was the chief reason for the President’s failure to furnish a working plan to the American Commissioners, he knowingly adopted the policy and clung to it with the tenacity of purpose which has been one of the qualities of mind that account for his great successes and for his great failures.  I use the adverb “knowingly” because it had been made clear to him that, in the judgment of others, the Commissioners ought to have the guidance furnished by a draft-treaty or by a definite statement of policies no matter how tentative or subject to change the draft or statement might be.

On the day that the President left Paris to return to the United States (February 14, 1919) I asked him if he had any instructions for the Commissioners during his absence concerning the settlements which should be included in the preliminary treaty of peace, as it was understood that the Council of Ten would continue its sessions for the consideration of the subjects requiring investigation and decision.  The President replied that he had no instructions, that the decisions could wait until he returned, though the hearings could proceed and reports could be made during his absence.  Astonished as I was at this wish to delay these matters, I suggested to him the subjects which I thought ought to go into the Treaty.  He answered that he did not care to discuss them at that time, which, as he was about to depart from Paris, meant that everything must rest until he had returned from his visit to Washington.

Since I was the head of the American Commission when the President was absent and became the spokesman for the United States on the Council of Ten, this refusal to disclose his views even in a general way placed me in a very awkward position.  Without instructions and without knowledge of the President’s wishes or purposes the conduct of the negotiations was difficult and progress toward actual settlements practically impossible.  As a matter of fact the Council did accomplish a great amount of work, while the President was away, in the collection of data and preparing questions for final settlement.  But so far as deciding questions was concerned, which ought to have been the principal duty of the Council of Ten, it simply “marked time,” as I had no power to decide or even to express an authoritative opinion on any subject.  It showed very clearly that the President intended to do everything himself and to allow no one to act for him unless it was upon some highly technical matter.  All actual decisions in regard to the terms of peace which involved policy were thus forced to await his time and pleasure.