The Crisis of the Naval War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 268 pages of information about The Crisis of the Naval War.

The Crisis of the Naval War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 268 pages of information about The Crisis of the Naval War.

Vice-Admiral W.S.  Sims had arrived in this country in March, 1917, after passing through an exciting experience, the ship in which he crossed (the United States steamer St. Louis) being mined outside Liverpool.  He came to visit me at the Admiralty immediately after his arrival in London, and from that day until I left the Admiralty at the end of the year it was my privilege and pleasure to work in the very closest co-operation with him.  My friendship with the Admiral was of very long standing.  We had during many years exchanged views on different naval subjects, but principally on gunnery questions.  I, in common with other British naval officers who had the honour of his acquaintance, had always been greatly struck by his wonderful success in the post of Inspector of Target Practice in the United States Navy.  That success was due not only to his intimate knowledge of gunnery, but also to his attractive personality, charm of manner, keen sense of humour, and quick and accurate grasp of any problem with which he was confronted.  It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that Admiral Sims should have been selected to command the United States forces in European waters, for to the qualities mentioned above he added a habit of speaking his mind with absolutely fearless disregard of the consequences.  This characteristic has led him on more than one occasion into difficulty, but in the circumstances with which we had to deal in 1917 it was just the quality that was needed.  It was a very difficult matter for those in authority in the United States, separated as they were by 3,000 miles of sea from the theatres of war, to realize the conditions in European waters, for the Admiralty was not concerned only with the North Sea and Atlantic, and the terse and straightforward reports of Admiral Sims, and his convincing statements, went a long way towards bringing home to the United States people at that time the extreme gravity of the situation and the need for immediate action.  He was consistently backed up by that great ambassador, the late Mr. W.H.  Page, who also honoured me with his confidence, and to whom I spoke perfectly freely on all occasions.

The assistance from the United States that it was hoped was now in sight made the prospect of success following on the adoption of the convoy system far more favourable, and preparations were put in hand for the institution of an ocean convoy system on a large scale.  In order to gain some experience of the difficulties attending the working of cargo ships, directions were given for an experimental convoy to be collected at Gibraltar.  The necessary officers were sent out to Gibraltar with orders to assemble the convoy, to instruct the masters in the work that lay before them, and to explain to them the system of sailing, the manner in which the convoy would be handled, and the protection that would be afforded.  This naturally took time, and the convoy did not arrive in England until after the middle of May.  The experience gained showed, however, that the difficulties apprehended by the officers of the Mercantile Marine were not insuperable, and that, given adequate protection by cruisers and small fast craft, the system was at least practicable.  It was accordingly decided to put it into operation at once, and to extend it as rapidly as the increase in the numbers of our destroyers and sloops permitted.

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The Crisis of the Naval War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.