The Crisis of the Naval War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 268 pages of information about The Crisis of the Naval War.

The Crisis of the Naval War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 268 pages of information about The Crisis of the Naval War.

The Chief of a Staff might have specialist knowledge himself, or he might assure himself that due weight had been given to the opinions of specialists attached to a Staff; but, on the other hand, it is possible that he might not have that knowledge and that he might ignore the opinions of the specialists.  The procedure suggested is at least as necessary when considering the question of training as it is in the case of operations.

In passing from this point I may say that I have heard the opinion expressed by military Staff officers that the war has shown that artillery is so all important that it would be desirable to place the Major-General of the Royal Artillery, now attached to General Headquarters, on the Staff for operational matters.

Finally, great care should be exercised to prevent the Staff becoming larger than is necessary, and there is some danger that the ignorant may gauge the value of the Staff by its size.

Von Schellendorff says on this subject: 

“The principle strictly followed throughout the German Service of reducing all Staffs to the smallest possible dimensions is moreover vindicated by restricting every Staff to what is absolutely necessary, and by not attaching to every Army, Army Corps and Divisional Staff representatives of all the various branches and departments according to any fixed rule.

“There cannot be the slightest doubt that the addition of every individual not absolutely required on a Staff is in itself an evil.  In the first place, it unnecessarily weakens the strength of the regiment from which an officer is taken.  Again it increases the difficulty of providing the Staff with quarters, which affects the troops that may happen to be quartered in the same place; and these are quite ready enough, as it is, occasionally to look with a certain amount of dislike—­though in most cases it is entirely uncalled for—­on the personnel of the higher Staffs.  Finally, it should be remembered—­and this is the most weighty argument against the proceeding—­that idleness is at the root of all mischief.  When there are too many officers on a Staff they cannot always find the work and occupation essential for their mental and physical welfare, and their superfluous energies soon make themselves felt in all sorts of objectionable ways.  Experience shows that whenever a Staff is unnecessarily numerous the ambitious before long take to intrigue, the litigious soon produce general friction, and the vain are never satisfied.  These failings, so common to human nature, even if all present, are to a great extent counteracted if those concerned have plenty of hard and constant work.  Besides, the numbers of a Staff being few, there is all the greater choice in the selection of the men who are to fill posts on it.  In forming a Staff for war the qualifications required include not only great professional knowledge and acquaintance with service routine, but above all things character, self-denial, energy, tact and discretion.”

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The Crisis of the Naval War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.