In the Baltic the situation became very difficult owing first to the Russian revolution and, finally, to the Russian debacle.  Our force in these waters consisted of seven submarines.  It became evident at the beginning of October, 1917, that the Germans were intending to carry out some operations in the Baltic against Russia, and the question of affording assistance was at once considered by the Naval Staff.  It was surmised that but little dependence could be placed on the Russian Baltic Fleet (events showed this surmise to be accurate), and in order to keep our control over the North Sea and ensure the safety of our communications with France it was obvious that for any action we might decide to take we should be obliged to divide the Grand Fleet, sending such portion of that Command into the Baltic as could successfully engage the High Sea Fleet if encountered, as well as to secure the return passage via the Great Belt, and retaining a sufficient force to deal with such German vessels as might attempt operations in the North Sea or Channel during our raid into the Baltic.

There were many ways in which the Germans might seriously hamper, if not entirely prevent, the return of our fleet from the Baltic unless we secured the exits.  The Great Belt could easily be closed by block-ships at its narrowest points, and extensive minefields could be laid.  It was obvious, therefore, that to secure the exit a strong force would be required, and that it would necessarily occupy a position where it would be open to serious attack.

The initial operation of gaining access to the Baltic via the Great Belt, though not impossible, was difficult, involving as it did sweeping passages through very extensive minefields, and even when our ships were in the Baltic fairly constant sweeping would be necessary.

Finally, the whole operation would be complicated by the question of fuel supply, especially to the destroyers and other small craft with a limited radius of action, since we could not depend upon Russian sources of supply.  These were amongst the considerations which made it clear that the operation was not one that I could recommend.  The Russian naval view is given in the following statement which appeared in the Russian Press in October: 

The Naval General Staff categorically denies the rumours circulated in Petrograd on the 8th and 9th instant, to the effect that the British or French Fleet had broken through to the Baltic Sea.

At the same time it is pointed out that it would be a physical impossibility for the Allies’ Fleet to come in from the western entrance, because it would be necessary to pass through the Sound or through one of the two Belts.

Entry to the Sound through Danish or Swedish waters could not also be affected owing to the fact that these waters in part are only 18 feet deep, while large-sized vessels would require at least 30 feet of water.

As regards the entry to the Belts, this would be an extremely hazardous undertaking as parts of the routes are under control of the Germans who have constructed their own defences consisting of mines and batteries.