cut off his messengers and evinced other hostile symptoms, which determined Harrison to at once march upon the town, when he was met by three Indians, one of them a principal counselor of the prophet, who avowed that the prophet’s designs were pacific.  Accordingly a suspension of hostilities was agreed upon, and the terms of peace were to be settled on the following morning by the governor and the prophet’s chief.  At night the army encamped about three fourths of a mile from the prophet’s town.

The governor was well convinced of the hostility of the prophet.  He believed that after attempting to lull his suspicions he intended to make a treacherous attack on the Americans.  Little anticipation of a night attack was indulged, yet every precaution was taken to resist one if made.  All the guards that could be used in such a situation, and all such as were used by Wayne, were employed on this occasion.  That is, camp guards, furnishing a chain of sentinels around the whole camp at such a distance as to give notice of the approach of an enemy in time for the troops to take their position, and yet not far enough to prevent the sentinels from retreating to the main body if overpowered.  The usual mode of stationing picket guards at a considerable distance in advance of the army or camp, would be useless in Indian warfare, as they do not require roads to march upon, and such guards would be inevitably cut off.  Orders were given in the event of a night attack, for each corps to maintain its position at all hazards until relieved or further orders were given to it.  The whole army was kept during the night in the military position called lying on their arms.  The regular troops lay in their tents with their accoutrements on, and their guns at their sides.  The militia had no tents, but slept with their clothes and bullet pouches on, and their guns under them, to keep them dry.  The order of the encampment was a line of battle to resist a night attack; and so, as every man slept opposite to his post in the line, there was nothing for the troops to do, in case of an assault, but to rise and take their position a few steps in the rear of the fires around which they had reposed.  The guard of the night consisted of two captains’ commands of forty-two men and of four non-commissioned officers each and two subalterns’ guards of twenty men and non-commissioned officers each—­the whole amounting to about one hundred and thirty men, under command of a field officer of the day.  The night was dark and cloudy, and after midnight there was a drizzling rain.

At four o’clock in the morning of Nov. 7, 1811, Governor Harrison, according to practice, had risen, preparatory to the calling up of the troops, and was engaged, while drawing on his boots by the fire, in conversation with General Wells, Colonel Owens, and Majors Taylor and Hurst.  The orderly drum had been roused to sound the reveille for the troops to turn out, when there came the report of a sentry’s rifle on the left flank, followed by a score of shots, and the morning air rang loud with the wild war-whoops of savages.